

Articulation of Islamic Political Parties in the Constellation Of National Politics Post Democratic Transition

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Abstract. Qur'an takes seriously the issue of poverty alleviation. Hence, the Government and BAZNAS also prioritize poverty. This research aims to examine the articulation of Islamic political parties post democratic transition. This is a literature study with an empirical sociological approach which is analyzed by means of content analysis. The results of the research show that Islamic political parties during the post democratic transition have fluctuated; however, they have never moved from the middle class. In the last five elections, it can be seen that Islamic political parties have stagnated (and even seems to decline) and are difficult to grow and develop. There are several contributing factors; first, the increasing number of Islamic political parties has caused the concentration of Muslims to break into many Islamic political parties. Second, the increasingly diluted political orientation of Muslims towards Islamic political parties. The secularization of politics that had occurred during the new order had contributed to the changing of political orientation of Muslims who no longer identified the party with Islam; third, the failure of Islamic political parties to show themselves as parties that have a distinctive difference compared to other nationalist political parties both related to political behavior or image and work programs; fourth, the shrewdness of nationalist parties in approaching Muslims by establishing wing organizations in each party; and the last one, the internal conflicts of Islamic political party elites that make constituents become apathetic about the future of these political parties.

Article history:

Keywords: Articulation of Islamic Political Parties, Political Constellation, Post, and Democracy Transition

Introduction

The emergence of Habibie replacing Suharto as the President of Indonesia in mid-1998 became the momentum for the rise of political Islam, i.e. realizing and actualizing Islam in official political institutions (power), precisely in the legislative and executive sectors or manifested in the form of political power (Azra, 2000). A new regime offering a multi-democratic system was considered the only viable option. This condition was similar to the situation in November 1945 when political parties emerged; like mushrooms in the rainy season and the euphoric atmosphere after successfully escaping from a long period of political repression and many political interests jockeying for position (Zada, 2002).

After several stages of verification, 48 political parties were selected to compete for the people's votes in the 1998 transitional elections. Twenty of the forty eight political parties were Islamic parties; some explicitly stated that they were Islamic parties, some used Islamic symbols as party symbols; some were nationalist

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parties, but had a Muslim constituency base (Salim, 1999). After the 1998 elections were held, the votes of Islamic political parties were insignificant when compared to the votes of nationalist political parties. In several previous elections, the same fate was experienced by Islamic political parties. For example, in the 1955 elections, the accumulation of Islamic political parties such as NU, Masyumi, Perti, PSII, AKUI, and PPTI received 45.2% compared to 54.8% of the votes of nationalist political parties. In the 1971 election, this condition was repeated in which Islamic political parties such as NU (18.67%), Parmusi (7.36%), and Perti (0.70%) differed from Golkar (62.8%), PNI (6.94%), Parkindo (1.34%), and the Catholic Party (1.11%). These gains were even smaller when the 1977 elections were held in which the PPP as the only Islamic political party representation only obtained 29.3%. Then in the next election in 1982, it got 27.8%, and in 1987 it only got 16.0% votes. In the 1999 elections, Islamic political parties also lagged behind other nationalist political parties. Meanwhile, in the 1999 elections, Islamic political parties continued to lose to nationalist parties such as Golkar and PDIP. Of the two major Islamic parties that participated in the competition, almost only PPP, PAN, PKB, PBB, and PK could be counted. This implies that the position of Islamic political parties was not fully supported by Muslims in Indonesia (Edyar, 2002).

Tabel 1. Political Party Seat Acquisition in the 1999 General Election (General Election Result of KPU, 2019)

| No | Political Party | Votes | Seat ; | Percentage (462+38) |
|-----|---|------------|--------|---------------------|
| 1 | Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan | 35.689.073 | 154 | 33,3 |
| 2 | Partai Golkar | 23.741.749 | 120 | 26 |
| 3 | Partai Persatuan Pembangunan | 11.329.905 | 59 | 11,6 |
| 4 | Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa | 13.336.982 | 51 | 10,2 |
| 5 | Partai Amanat Nasional | 7.528.956 | 35 | 6,8 |
| 6 | Partai Bulan Bintang | 2.049.708 | 13 | 2,6 |
| 7 | Partai Keadilan | 1.436.565 | 6 | 1,3 |
| 8 | Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan | 1.065.686 | 6 | 1,3 |
| 9 | Partai Nahdatul Ummah | 679,179 | 3 | 0,6 |
| 10 | Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa | 550,846 | 3 | 0,6 |
| 11 | Partai Bhineka Tunggal Ika | 364,291 | 3 | 0,6 |
| 12 | Partai Demokrasi Indonesia | 345,72 | 2 | 0,4 |
| 13 | Partai Persatuan | 655,052 | 1 | 0,2 |
| 14 | Partai Daulat Rakyat | 427,854 | 1 | 0,2 |
| 15 | Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia | 375,920 | 1 | 0,2 |
| 16 | Partai Nasional Indonesia Front Marhaenis | 365,176 | 1 | 0,2 |
| 17 | Partai Nasional Indonesia Massa Marhaen | 345,629 | 1 | 0,2 |
| 18 | Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia | 328,654 | 1 | 0,2 |
| 19 | Partai Kebangkitan Umat | 300,064 | 1 | 0,2 |
| 20 | Masyumi | 456,718 | 1 | 0,2 |
| 21` | Partai Katolik Demokrat | 216,675 | 1 | 0,2 |

The table above illustrates that of the top five vote-getters, practically only PPP achieved relatively good votes (11.6% with 59 DPR seats), followed by PKB with 10.1% with 51 DPR seats; PAN with 35 DPR seats (6.8%) votes; PBB with 13 parliamentary seats (2.6%); and PK with 6 seats (1.3%). Meanwhile, PNU obtained 3 DPR seats (0.6%).

After the reformation, Islamic political parties continue to exist in every election contestation. However, Islamic political parties are not always in a significant position to get votes, but are fluctuating. Sometimes they experience a slight increase, sometimes they experience a decrease. Some are even relegated because they do not meet the threshold to qualify for the Senayan.

There are several studies related to this research, such as Gili Argenti and Maulana Rifai (2015), who consider that there are 3 frameworks of thinking about Islam and politics in Indonesia (practically Islamic political parties included in it) which influence the relationship between political Islam and the state in the old order, new order, and reform order periods. In the old order period, the mainstream ideology of Islamic political parties was formalist Islam. Then, during the new order period, the relationship between political Islam and the state took the form of substantive Islam. As for the reformation period, there was a dialectic between three paradigms of political Islam, namely; formalist Islam, substantive Islam, and liberal Islam (Argenti & Rifai, 2015).

Then Yeby Ma'asan Mayrudin and M. Chairil Akbar (2019) found that identity politics is often used as a justification shield to fulfill short-term political interests. Although in the end, the struggle over identity politics is very likely to lead to all serious changes in internal party mechanisms and reinterpretation of party values to be more moderate and accommodating to the voting public. The goal, of course, is to get more votes in the next election (Mayrudin & Akbar, 2019).

After that, Triono (2014) found that there are six factors that cause the decline in the votes of Islamic political parties from election to election, i.e.: 1) Islamic political parties do not maximize themselves as distinctive political parties among voters. On the contrary, Islamic political parties seem to have failed to function among the constituents; 2) Islamic political parties are unable to manage voters' expectations where political communication among fellow Islamic parties to build strength is actually defeated by the sectoral ego of each political party; 3) the strengthening of the choice of "Islam Yes, Islamic Party No," among Indonesian Muslims. The tendency is that many Muslim communities in Indonesia do not support the strength of Islamic political parties; 4) the limited financial resources of Islamic political parties compared to nationalist parties; 5) as a side effect of the emergence of "anarchism" from certain groups that gave birth to collective anxiety in the general public; 6) the accommodation of Islamic figures by nationalist parties, some of them were recruited to become party administrators, then some were used as vote getters and even included in the list of parliamentary candidates (Triono, 2014).

There is also an article by Yeby Ma'asan Mayrudin (2014) that maps the ideological position of political parties, which are sometimes on the "left" side (secular nationalist), and sometimes also on the "right" side (Islam), and sometimes in the middle position (catch-all party). These parties tend to experience a shift

towards the "middle" except for those that are in the middle position. The shift in the ideological positioning of political parties can be divided into three forms; 1) conservative, where the party remains in the status quo as an ideological party; 2) progressive conservatism where there is a shift in political parties but not radically and is still considered moderate as PDIP and PKS; 3) extreme shift where the shift in ideological positioning occurs sharply as in PKB, PAN, PBB, PPP, Gerindra, and PKPI (Mayrudin, 2017).

Then, Mikail (2015) stated that the political characteristics in Indonesia experienced significant changes after the reformation. Before the reformation, Islamic political power was full of dynamics along with the concept of the regime at that time which depoliticized. In the end, the power of political Islam was in a marginal position and difficult to develop ideas due to the repressiveness of the new order regime. No wonder then that only the nationalist political parties were dominant in every election in the midst of a Muslim-majority population (Mikail, 2015).

Another study by Adi Budiman Subiakto and Nur Khafid (2016) reveals the political strategies of Islamic political parties to meet the 3.5% parliamentary threshold in 2014 (especially PAN and PKB). Initially, it was thought that PAN and PKB would find it difficult to pass the threshold, but in fact they did. PKB had a defensive strategy by prioritizing constituencies in villages, using the ideological slice of the jamiyah (NU), and then using certain figures or artists when campaigning. Meanwhile, PAN uses an offensive strategy by maximizing constituents in urban areas dialogically, populist issues, and psychological closeness while utilizing artist figures (Subiakto & Khafid, 2014).

The distinction of this research is in the comprehensiveness of the study related to Islamic political parties in the country and the solutions offered. This research is a qualitative research with a socio-historical approach. The sociological approach, especially the sociology of law, was carried out to observe the patterns of interaction of stake holders in society, while the historical approach was used on the basis of the consideration that historical analysis would be able to see objectively the reality of Islamic political parties in Indonesia for a certain period of time. The data that the author gets were analyzed with descriptive analytical thinking flow, and after describing a problem comprehensively then an analysis of the topic was carried out.

Results and Discussion

Islamic political parties are political parties that make Islam a political identity; it can be in the name, symbol, principle, and or constituent base, and can also be a combination of several of the above criteria. The criteria for Islamic political parties, among others expressed by Arsykal, are; principles, constituents, goals, symbols, and the background of the establishment of the party. Of the twenty Islamic political parties participating in the 1999 elections, some of them, such as the UN, PPP, and PK, aim to fight for Islamic Shari'a in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the National Mandate Party and the National Awakening Party call themselves nationalist parties. In fact, according to MC Ricklefs, the National Mandate Party is a party that promotes the ideology of capitalist democratic secularism. The National Awakening Party,

founded by Gus Dur, fights for pluralism, tolerance and non-religious democracy (Ricklefs, 2005). Later Warsisto added the term cadre party (apparently for PKS) for other Islamic political parties (Raharjo, 1986).

The reality of Islamic political parties that are not single, is essentially a reflection of the plurality of Muslims and the diversity of interests among Indonesian Muslims. This is also a manifestation of the political euphoria of the democratic process that must occur. The practice of reform that is being held is also a breath of fresh air of true independence for the people when voicing aspirations that have been veiled by centralized absolute power for more than 30 years (Zada, 2002).

It cannot be denied that the birth of several Islamic political parties at the beginning of the reformation has historical roots with the 1955 elections (not to call it a reincarnation) such as Masyumi, NU, PSII, PERTI, and PPTI. In general, the Islamic political parties that emerged still had a distinction in several ways compared to before, for example; 1) during the New Order era, Islamic political parties were single (PPP), after the reformation turned into pluralism; 2) Islamic political parties during the reformation period prioritized substance compared to before that prioritized formalism; 3) during the reformation period Islamic political parties were more impressive as inclusive and nationalistic-minded political parties compared to before that seemed exclusive (Thohari, 2000).

The connection between Islamic political parties and the 1955 elections can be traced, for example, the Indonesian Islamic Sarikat Party which gave rise to two PSII parties, namely PSII Matraman led by Taufik Tjokroaminoto and PSII Latumenten led by Bustaman which had the PSII 1905 appendage. Likewise, there were three PTIs: *Partai Persatuan Tharikat Islam* (the Islamic Tharikat Unity Party) led by Muchtar Doyah; *Partai Politik Tharikat Islam* (the Islamic Tharikat Political Party) led by Rahman Sabon; and *Partai Pengamal Thareqat Indonesia* (the Indonesian Thareqat Practitioners Party) led by Masykur Loamena.

Then there were also three Masyumi continuation parties; *Partai Masyarakat Umat Muslimin Indonesia* (Indonesian Muslim Community Party/New Masyumi/PMB), *Partai Politik Islam Masyumi* (Masyumi Islamic Political Party/PPIM) and *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB). Meanwhile, the parties that claim to have a mass base of PERTI, which believes in Ahlu Sunnah wa Jamaah were *Partai Aliansi Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia /AKAMSI* (the Indonesian Muslim Awakening Alliance Party), *Partai Kebangkitan Kaum Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah /PAKKAM* (the Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah Awakening Party), *Partai Era Reformasi Tarbiyah Islamiyah / PERTI* (the Tarbiyah Islamiyah Reform Era Party), and *Partai Bhakti Muslim / PBM* (the Muslim Bhakti Party). Finally, four parties emerged from Nahdatul Ulama; *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (the National Awakening Party), *Partai Nahdatul Ummat* (Nahdatul Ummat Party), *Partai Kebangkitan Ummat* (Ummat Awakening Party), and *Partai Solidarita Uni Nasional Indonesia* (the Indonesian National Union Solidarity Party) (Salim, 2000).

The birth of the Islamic Party at the beginning of the reformation raised doubts for some people. Firstly, some intellectuals at that time had a kind of historical trauma related to the repressiveness of the previous rulers when restraining the

tendency of political Islam. This had left a traumatic failure for Muslims, especially the failure to fight for the basis of an Islamic state in the Constituante Session in the 50s, which had an unfavorable impact on the course of the nation's history. In addition, the ruler's policy of cutting off the Islamic Movement that leads to it by using it as a means of justification.

Secondly, the accusations of some parties that political Islam is synonymous with an Islamic state have not disappeared. That is why it is not an exaggeration that every movement that is indicated to be there is immediately uprooted to its roots, exactly what the Orba government did at that time. In other words, Islamic political parties often bear a heavy burden related to this ideologically.

Third, the poor image of Islamic political parties in the eyes of the public is related to the frequent internal conflicts that do not end (Edyar, 2002). This condition suggests that Islamic politics does not accommodate the aspirations of its supporters, but rather prioritizes the interests of the party's internal elite (Muhammad, 2000).

Some of these concerns did become the homework of Islamic political parties in the next election in 2004. This election was attended by 24 political parties. Of the 24 political parties, one third (eight political parties) were Islamic parties. These parties included; PPP, PAN, PKB, PKS, PBB, PBR, PNUI/PPNUI, and PPIB. Overall in this election, Golkar won the most votes with 21.58% of the vote (24,461,104) along with 128 DPR seats. PDIP followed with 18.31% of the vote (20,710,006) and 109 DPR seats. Compared to the 1999 election Golkar received a slight increase in votes and DPR seats. In the previous 1999 election Golkar received 23,741,749 votes with 120 DPR seats. Meanwhile, PDIP lost relatively many votes and DPR seats. In the 1999 election, PDIP received 153 DPR seats with 35,689,073 votes. PPP followed after PDIP with 58 seats; then Demokrat (55); PAN (53 seats); PKB (52 seats); PKS (45); PBR (14), and PBB (11). Other Islamic political parties failed to place representatives in Senayan (General Election Result of KPU, 2019).

An interesting event in the 2004 elections was the vote share of the Demokrat and PKS. Demokrat managed to get 7.45%, even though it was a newcomer to Indonesian elections. Meanwhile, PKS experienced a sharp increase in votes (DPR seats) compared to before. In the 1999 elections, PKS only got 6 seats in parliament so that it had to merge with PAN in the reform faction because it did not pass the electoral threshold, but in the 2004 elections, PKS received 7.34% of the vote with 45 DPR seats. This reality ensures that PKS can represent the will of some people who aspire to be the Islamic party they want (Mikail, 2015).

Tabel 2. Vote Acquisition of Political Parties in the 2004 General Election
(General Election Result of KPU, 2019)

| No | Political Party | Votes | DPR Seats | % |
|----|-----------------|------------|-----------|-------|
| 1 | Partai Golkar | 24.461.104 | 128 | 21,62 |

| | | | | |
|----|--|------------|-----|-------|
| 2 | PDI Perjuangan | 20.710.006 | 109 | 18,31 |
| 3 | Partai Persatuan Pembangunan | 9.226.444 | 58 | 8,16 |
| 4 | Partai Demokrat | 8.437.868 | 55 | 7,46 |
| 5 | Partai Amanat Nasional | 7.255.331 | 53 | 6,41 |
| 6 | Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa | 12.002.885 | 52 | 10,61 |
| 7 | Partai Keadilan Sejahtera | 8.149.457 | 45 | 7,20 |
| 8 | Partai Bintang Reformasi | 2.944.529 | 14 | 2,60 |
| 9 | Partai Damai Sejahtera | 2.424.319 | 13 | 2,14 |
| 10 | Partai Bulan Bintang | 2.965.040 | 11 | 2,62 |
| 11 | Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan | 1.310.207 | 4 | 1,16 |
| 12 | Partai Pelopor | 896,603 | 3 | 0,79 |
| 13 | Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa | 2.394.651 | 2 | 2,12 |
| 14 | Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme | 906,739 | 1 | 0,80 |
| 15 | Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia | 844,48 | 1 | 0,75 |
| 16 | Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia | 1.420.085 | 1 | 1,26 |

Of the 16 political parties that have representatives in the DPR, Bakir Ihsan categorizes them into two extremes: the right (religious) and the left (secularist). The religious line included parties that place Islam as an ideology such as PPP, PBB, and PKS, or parties that had an Islamic base such as PAN and PKB. Secularists were parties that did not associate their party directly with religion (Ihsan,). Actually, in parliamentary sessions, when discussing issues related to religious views (especially Islam), many political parties that were identified as secular parties support the legislation. It seems that ideological barriers melt when issues related to Islam are debated in parliament.

Overall, out of a total of 24 political parties that participated in the 2004 elections, seven Islamic political parties and Islamic mass-based parties participated in the elections (General Election Result of KPU, 2019). The seven political parties were:

Table 3. Vote and Seat Acquisition of Islamic Political Parties in 2004 (General Election Result of KPU, 2019)

| No | Political Party | Votes | DPR Seats | % |
|----|---------------------------|------------|-----------|------|
| 1 | Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa | 11.989.564 | 52 | 10,6 |

| | | | | |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------|----|-----|
| 2 | Partai Persatuan Pembangunan | 9.248.764 | 58 | 8,2 |
| 3 | Partai Keadilan Sejahtera | 8.325.020 | 45 | 7,3 |
| 4 | Partai Amanat Nasional | 7.303.324 | 53 | 6,4 |
| 5 | Partai Bintang Reformasi | 2.764.998 | 14 | 2,4 |
| 6 | Partai Bulan Bintang | 2.970.487 | 11 | 2,6 |
| 7 | Partai Nahdhatul Umat Indonesia | 895.610 | 0 | 0,8 |

If the votes of Islamic political parties were calculated as a whole in the 2002 elections, it would amount to around 38%. This reality indicated; a) apart from PKS, the percentage of votes of Islamic parties in the DPR had decreased; 2) a significant decrease in votes was experienced by PPP; 3) PKB also experienced a decline of about 2.3% (from 12.60% in 1999 to 10.57 in 2004). The internal conflict between Alwi Sihab's PKB and Matori Abdul Jalil's PKB seemed to have affected the votes of this political party; 4) the increase in votes compared to the 1999 election was experienced by *Partai Bulan Bintang* with a range of 1.94% versus 2.62%, but the acquisition of DPR seats actually decreased with a ratio of 13 in the 1999 election versus 11 in 2004; 5) after metamorphosing into *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (The Prosperous Justice Party), PKS, which was formerly called PK, increased its vote share from 1.36% in the 1999 election to 7.34% in 2004; 6) while *Partai Amanat Nasional* (the National Mandate Party) decreased its vote share from 7.12% in the 1999 election to 6.44% in the 2004 election, but because the distribution of voters was more evenly distributed in fewer places, its DPR seats actually increased from 34 in the 1999 election to 53 in 2004. PAN, on the other hand, saw its percentage of the electorate drop from 7.12% (1999) to 6.44% (2004).

The success story of new political parties in gaining votes in the 2004 elections was intertwined with the critical attitude of voters that has recently emerged. The attitude of politicians in the 1999-2004 period, which was considered not meeting voters' expectations, was one of the main reasons why urban Muslim voters switched to PKS, which was believed to have a clear vision and mission in promoting a modern and clean Islamic image. The Democratic Party founded by SBY, in the view of nationalist voters, was an antithesis to Megawati's position as president, while they want change.

The 2009 elections were actually not too different from the previous elections. There were 38 national political parties and six local parties ([A Result of the Helsinki Agreement, 2005](#)). As a result, of the 38 election participants, only 9 won seats in the DPR. Seven of the nine political parties were participants in the previous election. The two new political parties that succeeded in winning the hearts of the people were the Hanura Party founded by Wiranto and the Gerindra Party initiated by Prabowo Subianto. The other new political parties failed to make it to Senayan. The biggest surprise in this election was that the Democrat's vote share, which used to be only seven and a half percent, jumped dramatically to 20.85%. The Democrats not only

outperformed PDIP and Golkar, but also became number one in the election. The SBY effect seemed to have been very influential in the increase in votes for the party bearing the mercy symbol. As the winner of the legislative elections, the party eventually placed Marzuki Ali (then party secretary) as the Speaker of the House of Representatives for the 2009-2014 periods (Mikail, 2015).

Tabel 4. The following table shows the votes of political parties in the 2009 elections (General Election Result of KPU, 2019)

| No | Political Party | Votes | DPR Seats | % |
|----|---------------------------------------|------------|-----------|-------|
| 1 | Partai Demokrat | 21.655.295 | 149 | 20,81 |
| 2 | Partai Golkar | 15.031.497 | 106 | 14,45 |
| 3 | Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan | 14.576.388 | 95 | 14,01 |
| 4 | Partai Keadilan Sejahtera | 8.204.946 | 57 | 7,89 |
| 5 | Partai Amanat Nasional | 6.273.462 | 46 | 6,03 |
| 6 | Partai Persatuan Pembangunan | 5.544.332 | 38 | 5,33 |
| 7 | Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa | 5.146.302 | 28 | 4,95 |
| 8 | Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya | 4.642.795 | 26 | 4,46 |
| 9 | Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat | 3.925.620 | 17 | 3,77 |

In the 2009 elections, there were nine Islamic political parties (which included mainly Muslim constituencies). Of the nine political parties, it turns out that only 4 Islamic political parties have succeeded in placing representatives in Senayan. Researchers who excluded PAN and PKB from Islamic political parties said that only seven were included in the 38 political parties participating in the election, namely PPP, PBB, PBR, PKS, PNUI, PKNU, and PMB). Of these seven, only PPP and PKS won seats in the DPR (with 57 and 38 respectively (Ihsan, 2004).

Since participating in the elections in 1999, the vote share of this cadre party has continued to increase, namely 1.4% (7 DPR seats) in 1999, then increased to 7.3% (45 DPR seats) in 2004, and increased again to 7.88% (57 DPR seats) in 2009 (Mikail, 2015).

Tabel 5. As a whole, the vote acquisition of Paprol Islam can be seen in the following table (General Election Result of KPU, 2019) :

| NO | Political Party | Votes | DPR Seats | % |
|----|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|------|
| 1 | Partai Keadilan Sejahtera | 8.206.955 | 57 | 7,89 |

| | | | | |
|---|------------------------------|-----------|----|------|
| 2 | Partai Amanat Nasional | 6.254.580 | 46 | 6,03 |
| 3 | Partai Persatuan Pembangunan | 5.533.214 | 37 | 5,33 |
| 4 | Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa | 5.146.122 | 28 | 4,95 |

Overall, Islamic parties experienced turbulence in this election where they only got 169 seats in the DPR through PKS (57 seats or 7.89%), PAN (46 seats or 6.03%), PPP (38 seats or 5.33%), and PKB (28 seats or 4.95%). Meanwhile, nationalist parties received 391 DPR seats. This condition could be caused by changes in voter behavior where they no longer looked at the ideology of a political party in determining their choice, but rather looked at the belief that the party can bring Indonesia to a better direction and look at whether or not the people in the political party are clean from corruption and collusion practices. However, the reasons for certain figures were also the basis of choice, such as PDIP with Megawati and the Democratic Party with SBY.

Tabel 6. Meanwhile, the 2014 election resulted in the following ([General Election of Indonesia, 2014](#)) :

| NO | Political Party | Votes | DPR Seats | % |
|----|---|-------------|-----------|------|
| 1 | Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan | 23.681.471 | 109 | 19,5 |
| 2 | Partai Golongan Karya | 18.432.312 | 91 | 16,2 |
| 3 | Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya | 14.760.371 | 73 | 13,0 |
| 4 | Partai Demokrat | 12.728.913 | 61 | 10,9 |
| 5 | Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa | 11.298.957 | 47 | 8,4 |
| 6 | Partai Amanat Nasional | 9.481.621 | 49 | 8,7 |
| 7 | Partai Keadilan Sejahtera | 8.480.204 | 40 | 7,1 |
| 8 | Partai Nasdem | 8.402.812 | 35 | 6,3 |
| 9 | Partai Persatuan Pembangunan | 8.157.488 | 39 | 7,0 |
| 10 | Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat | 6.579.498 | 16 | 2,9 |
| 11 | Partai Bulan Bintang | 1.825.750 | 0 | 0 |
| 12 | Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia | 1.143.094 | 0 | 0 |
| | Total | 124.972.491 | 560 | 100% |

Of the twelve parties participating in the 2014 elections above, 5 of them were Islamic parties, namely PKB, PAN, PKS, PPP, and PBB. However, there was a downward trend in the vote acquisition of these Islamic political parties. PKB, for example, only received 11,298,957 votes (9.04% of the national vote) and 47 seats in the DPR (8.4%), followed by PAN with 9,481,621 votes (7.59%) and 49 seats in the DPR (8.7%); *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party) with 8,480,204 votes (6.79%) and 40 DPR seats (7.1%), and; *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United

Development Party) with 8,157,488 votes (6.53%) and 39 DPR seats (7.0%). Meanwhile, *Partai Bulan Bintang* (the Crescent Star Party) only received 1,825,750 votes (1.46%) and failed to pass the parliamentary threshold (3.5%) so that it did not place a single representative in the DPR. If the number of votes of Islamic political parties was calculated, it amounted to 37,418,270. This was even further compared to the votes of nationalist (non-Islamic) political parties, which reached 76,182,565 votes or less than half of the overall national political party votes, or comparable to 385 versus 175 seats in the DPR.

In the 2014 elections, the vote share of Islamic political parties was even more depressing. Practically only PKB was able to gain significant votes, namely 9.04% or 47 parliamentary seats. There are many contributing factors, among others; 1) in the 2019 elections, PKS was the dominant political party with a campaign as a clean party, but before the 2014 elections, the leadership of this cadre party was involved in corruption cases (although still debatable) so that it began to be abandoned by voters; 2) the highlighting of Islamic political party figures who became public officials with luxurious lifestyles by owning assets in certain areas was one of the reasons for the emergence of antipathy on the part of the community (Mikail, 2015).

Tabel 7. Meanwhile, the 2019 election can be seen in the following table ([General Election of Indonesia, 2019](#)):

| NO | Political Party | Votes | DPR Seats | % |
|----|---------------------------------------|------------|-----------|-------|
| 1 | Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan | 27.503.961 | 128 | 22,26 |
| 2 | Partai Golongan Karya | 17.229.789 | 85 | 14,78 |
| 3 | Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya | 17.596.839 | 78 | 13,57 |
| 4 | Partai Nasionalis Demokrat | 12.661.792 | 59 | 10,26 |
| 5 | Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa | 13.570.970 | 58 | 10,09 |
| 6 | Partai Demokrat | 10.876.057 | 54 | 9,39 |
| 7 | Partai Keadilan Sejahtera | 11.493.663 | 50 | 8,70 |
| 8 | Partai Amanat Nasional | 9.572.623 | 44 | 7,65 |
| 9 | Partai Persatuan Pembangunan | 6.323.147 | 19 | 3,30 |

In the 2019 elections, there were 16 political parties with 4 representatives from Islamic parties, namely PKB, PKS, PAN, and PPP. The vote share of Islamic political parties continued to decline, such as PKB with 10.09% (58 seats in the DPR); followed by PKS with 8.70% (50 seats); PAN with 44 seats (7.65); and finally PPP with 19 seats (3.30% of the vote). This shows the decreasing interest of Islamic political parties.

The decline in the number of seats or votes of Islamic political parties in the reform era compared to the previous era is very likely due to several factors; first, the increasing number of Islamic political parties has caused the concentration of Muslims to be divided into many Islamic political parties. It seems that the Islamic

political elite at that time envisioned a festive atmosphere at that time because of the abundant votes to the dozens of Islamic political parties. So they could divide the seats in the DPR. In other words, their overestimation at that time was so high that they calculated the masses like plotting land; that part is mine, this part is ours. The large number of Islamic political parties also caused many votes to be wasted. This is because the stembus accord of Islamic political parties at that time also failed to be realized (Edyar, 2002).

The discussion on the stembus accord itself in the 1999 elections was tough. The results of the distribution of seats determined by the Indonesian Election Committee (PPI) were rejected by the Islamic party group that did the stembus accord. According to PPI, Islamic parties that originally agreed to stembus accord would get 40 seats. Meanwhile, according to PPI, the 8 Islamic parties that agreed to stembus accord were entitled to 53 of the remaining 120 seats. This difference of opinion was finally brought to the KPU and voted with two options; the division of seats with regard to the stembus accord vote or the division without regard to the stembus accord. 12 people agreed to the stembus accord, 43 disagreed and 8 abstained. Finally, it was decided without paying attention to the stembus accord. The results of the seat distribution showed that the five major parties won 417 DPR seats or 90.26 percent of the 462 seats up for grabs. The winner was PDI-P, which won 35,689,073 votes or 33.74 percent with 153 seats. Golkar received 23,741,758 votes or 22.44 percent, resulting in 120 seats or a loss of 205 seats compared to the 1997 election. PKB with 13,336,982 votes or 12.61 percent, received 51 seats. PPP with 11,329,905 votes or 10.71 percent, getting 58 seats or losing 31 seats compared to the 1997 elections. PAN won 7,528,956 votes or 7.12 percent, getting 34 seats (KPU, 2019).

The vote configuration of the political parties in 1999 showed moderate pluralism. According to Andreas Ufen, although 1955-style politics plays a role, dealiranization has begun to occur. This means that the party system format, although plural, shows a moderate tendency. Ideological differences are not as sharp as in the 1955 election (Hanafie & Suryani,).

Second, the increasingly melting political orientation of Muslims towards Islamic political parties. The secularization of politics that took place during the New Order has contributed to the changing of the political orientation of Muslims who no longer identify parties with Islam (Ihsan, 2016). In addition, the secularization of new order politics has diluted the meaning of a number of key concepts such as "Muslims", "Islamic leaders", "Muslim scholars", and so on. In the past, the term "Islamic leaders" was limited to those from Islamic parties or other Islamic organizations. Now those who are not from Islamic organizations but pay attention to and fight for the interests of Islam are also seen as Islamic leaders. Likewise, the term "Muslim scholars" is no longer limited to scholars who come from the santri (Islamic boarding school) environment, but also those who can be referred to as abangan as seen in ICMI (which previously appeared). The dilution of these key concepts opens up a

broader spectrum for achieving the political and cultural aspirations of Muslims (Azra, 2008).

However, the commitment and Islamic considerations shown by Islamic political parties still exist with different intensities and formulations. The existence of Islamic political parties in national politics shows that the aspirations of the public (Muslims) are still placed on Islamic political parties that cannot be separated from Islamic political ideology. This is proven by the existence of Islamic political parties that continue to exist in four elections in the reform era. One of the Islamic political parties that is able to survive and meet the minimum electoral threshold is *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (the United Development Party) (Ihsan, 2016). The ET provision or the minimum threshold of party votes to participate in the election was used in the 1999 election (2 percent), 2004 (3 percent), 2009 with the parliamentary threshold (the minimum threshold for obtaining seats in the DPR RI is 2.5 percent and in the 2014 election it was 3.5 percent).

Five general elections, electing legislative members and presidents and vice presidents, have been held after the reformation, namely in 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019. In these five elections, Islamic political parties have experienced ups and downs, and the acquisition rate of Islamic political parties in general elections is relatively small, which is below 10%. Meanwhile, the majority of Muslim voters are 88% of Indonesia's population of 240 million. This phenomenon means that the votes of Islamic political parties do not reflect the power of the majority voters. The main problem is that it does not reflect the power of the majority voters is that the political elite is very weak in managing civic culture (tradition of democratic political culture) and political engagement (voters' feelings and interest in Islamic political parties) towards the mass base of Islamic political parties. The low level of management from the political elite on the two aspects above has an impact on the low political interest of the mass of voters of Islamic political parties (Mujami, Liddle & Ambardi, 2012).

There are three issues in globalization related to Islamic political parties, namely: (1) the issue of borderless, a world without borders, namely the development of relations between individuals both in the context of cross-border countries, nations, tribes, races, and religions. The borderless nature has implications for the growth of information and communication technology; (2) the growth of the diaspora as a result of the borderless, so it is necessary to deconstruct it to give recognition to the cultural identity of the community. Recognition of identity is very important, even in this context the state and political parties cannot hegemonize identity. The interpretation that needs to be put forward in the context of political parties is that negative or positive "political stigma" can increase or decrease the number of votes from the Islamic mass base group; (3) globalization spurs conflict due to the obstructed deconstruction process. Debates about orthodoxy and syncretic, modern and traditional, liberal and conservative, and radical and harmony are psychological phenomena that can affect voter turnout (Ahmad, 2004).

The 2024 election is still risky because of the divisions in Islamic political parties. An example is PAN, which continues to decline in votes, recently left behind by Amin Rais who founded it. Currently Amin Rais has instead founded *Partai Umat* (the Ummah Party). Then PKS also experienced the same fate, abandoned by Anis Mata and Fakhri Hamzah who both struggled to establish this cadre party. Fakhri and Anis are now running with *Partai Gelora* (Indonesian People's Wave) which they founded in 2019.

Conclusion

The transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic one after the fall of new order has awakened the political enthusiasm of Indonesian Muslims who then established political parties to fill the life of the nation and state. Not surprisingly, in every election from the 1999 democratic transition to the current democratic era, Islamic political parties have always accompanied the state process both in government and in parliament. In the last five elections, Islamic political parties have always been in the middle class group under nationalist parties. It seems that Islamic political parties find it difficult to advance to become the top vote-getters in elections or to get seats in the DPR. In fact, the trend is not only stagnant but continues to show a declining graph.

There are many factors that make it difficult for Islamic political parties to develop in the country; 1) internal conflicts of Muslim political elites in one party. Political elites who feel that they are not accommodated by the party management, then establish a new party which in fact has a mass base from among Muslims as well; 2) the absence of a clear distinction between Islamic political parties and other nationalist political parties, both in the program and the behavior of the political elite; 3) the emergence of Islamic political wings in nationalist parties so as to create the impression that the party is also concerned with the interests of Muslims. PDIP for example with its Baitul Musliminn wing, then the existence of the Zikir Assembly wing in the Democratic Party, as well as the Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah (MDI) wing in the Golkar Party, and so on; 3) the increasingly melting ideological barriers of political parties in the view of the public who mostly want the substance of a religious and national life.

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